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 Changes in  American Court Advocacy during the  
Long Nineteenth Century: Classical influences, their 
decline, similarities and  comparisons with England 






          Important alterations in the style and content of court advocacy occurred throughout the 
common law world in the Nineteenth Century. This article turns to the United States, where a sea 
change in advocacy took place, and to similarities and differences with England and Wales.  
Matters considered include: influences of  Greek and Roman classics and rhetoric in late 
Eighteenth  Century and first half of the Nineteenth Century America  and their  decline 
thereafter; key changes in evidence and procedure; discussion  whether advocates should be 
allowed to express belief in the causes of their clients and later adoption of professional rules 
forbidding the practice; granting accused persons the right to give evidence on oath; the 
presence of expert witnesses in court; the introduction of plea bargaining procedure and the 
origins of bench trials.   
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In the 19th century considerable alterations in advocacy took place throughout the 
common law world; not just England and Wales. Major developments occurred in the 
United States, very conspicuously in criminal courtroom advocacy. However, there was 
nothing akin to the English and Welsh Prisoners Counsel Act 1836 (and the debate which 
preceded it), a milestone,  granting prisoners charged with felonies the right of a full 
defence by counsel: That right had already been secured in all states and Federal courts  
under the Bill of Rights (Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution) 1789.  
 
 The place of the Greek and Roman classics and rhetoric in advocacy in late 18th Century 
America and in the first half of the Nineteenth Century is explored in this article.  Use by many 
attorneys of an apologetic, dispassionate and formulaic type of criminal advocacy bearing much 
of the influence of Cicero,  strongly  contrasts with the extravagant , melodramatic and flowery 
styles of address in the English courts at the time. However, changes in procedure, laws of 
evidence and the prevailing general style of public oratory led, in the third quarter of the 19th 
Century to attorneys assuming the mix of flamboyance, appeal to emotion and aggression which 
has been their hallmark before juries ever since.  As in England and Wales, discussion occurred 
about whether advocates should be allowed to express belief in the causes of their clients and 
later professional rules forbidding the practice were adopted. Further, like in England, it became 
necessary for attorneys in the United States to adjust to laws granting accused persons the right 
to give evidence on oath and also to the presence of expert witnesses in court. Attorneys in 
criminal cases, had to be able to conduct plea bargaining, a procedure which arose independently 
in a number of jurisdictions in the early mid -19th Century, and pleas in mitigation. The late 19th 
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Century saw the beginnings of bench trials which became more frequent in the following 
century. Taking the jury out of the court had a huge impact on advocacy. Unlike jurors, judges 
had no time for stirring speeches, sensationalism and histrionics. Strict attention to evidence and 
law by attorneys was required.  
 
Cicero and other classical influences.  
Until roughly the mid-19th century most criminal advocacy was largely apologetic, 
deliberately avoiding extravagance, fervour and pushiness. Although by 1800 it had begun to 
be overshadowed in politics and the pulpit by newer models of persuasive eloquence which 
emphasised plainer speech and effective elocution, Ciceronian oratorical techniques still 
strongly influenced lawyers during the opening decades of the 19th century. 
 Use of classical argumentation, allusions and sentence structure dated back to the 
preceding century when much education centred around knowledge of antiquity. Richard 
Davis in his Intellectual Life in Jefferson’s Virginia 1  wrote : 
 
“Americans , Virginians especially, were fully aware of formal critiques of the art of 
eloquence from ancient Greece to their own time. During the latter half of the eighteenth 
century colleges taught rhetorical theory, including Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, 
Cicero’s De Oratore and the critical epistles of Horace and Longinus”2 .  
 
1 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964, Page 365. Classical influences on early America have 
long been noted. See Mullet, C.F, Classical Influences on the American Revolution, Vol 35 Classical Journal, 
1939-40, pp. 92-104 and Meyer Reinhold, ed., The Classick Pages: Classical Reading of Eighteenth Century 
Americans, University Park, Pennsylvania State University, 1975. 
2 On the study of classical rhetoric in Connecticut, especially at Yale, from where, after the Revolution, the 
number of graduates going to the bar exceeded those going to the pulpit, see Christopher Grasso, A Speaking 
Aristocracy, University of North Carolina Press, 1999, Chapter 8. 
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 When Davies wrote  of “Americans” and “Virginians” he did not, of course, refer to  the 
population at large but to  a very small, though highly influential, classically educated 
minority. 
The 2nd Century orator, politician, general and writer, Cato the Elder also had a strong 
appeal to Virginians3 whilst Cicero was particularly admired as an orator and philosopher in 
New England 4. 
 
As the Fathers of the American Republican were no strangers to ancient Rome and 
Greece, it is perhaps not surprising to find references to things classical in the decisions of 
judges in federal and state courts of the new nation. In a study based on the years 1790 – 1800, 
Richard J. Hoffman 5 focused on the Supreme Court of the United States and the Virginia Court 
of Chancery, the latter because of the importance of its first sole Chancellor, George Wythe, a 
man who was significant in national and state politics and, as a judge, key to the development 
of law in Virginia. He was also in the opinion of Thomas Jefferson “the best Latin and Greek 
scholar in the State” and was dubbed by his contemporaries “a walking library”. Hoffman 
found that the sources and functions of the classical references in the judgments of Wythe and 
the Supreme Court were similar. Allusions and quotes were drawn from Greek and Roman 
literature, history and mythology. Any dissimilarity between the two courts came in the 
frequency of the references and in the use of Roman Law. Wythe made extensive use of the 
classics, especially of the Corpus Iuris Civilis of Justinian, while the Supreme Court justices 
 
3 See Fredric M. Litto, Addison’s Cato in the Colonies, William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., Vol., 23, 1966, 
pp. 431-449.  
4 Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role Model for Early American Lawyers: A Case Study in Early Classical 
Influence, Classical Journal Vol. 73, pp .313 - 321. 
5 Richard J. Hoffman, Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1880, American Journal of Legal 




were more sparing in their allusions and made no reference to Roman Law. In neither court 
were references generally made for the mere display of erudition by judges but for literary 
functions that were identical and fell into three broad categories. First specific quotes from 
classical literature were used to express a particular feeling, or sentiment , of the user. Second, 
quotes or allusions were employed as similes. In the third category as an extended simile by 
which ancient events or points of law were used as precedents for the holdings or views of 
judges 6. In both courts the percentage of cases in which classical references are present 
amounted to twenty percent. Interestingly, Robert Hoffman examined judgments from the 
same period by the English High Court of Chancery and King’s Bench. Usually each 
Chancellor and Chief Justice was classically educated, to a level beyond most American jurists, 
and had the ability both to read and write Latin and Greek. Some, like Lord Mansfield and 
Lord Loughborough, were also trained in Roman Law. Given this, it could reasonably be 
expected that their judgments would be liberally sprinkled with quotes and allusions from 
antiquity and contain numerous citations from Roman Law. The contrary appears to be the 
case. Hoffman read Chancery and Kings Bench decisions between 1790 and 1800, and 
occasionally before and after, at random. Against expectations, he found that few classical 
allusions appeared in them 7. Only rarely was Roman Law cited in arguments before the courts 
 
6 Hoffman, ibid, pp.57-58.  Chancellor Wythe, in the Virginia High Court of Chancery, made 85 classical 
references in a total of 21 reported cases. Of these, 39 appear in the text of the judgment and 46 are contained 
in notes added either simultaneously or later for publication. In the Supreme Court 12 classical references are 
made in five cases by four Supreme Court justices, one Attorney General and several attorneys arguing before 
the court. 
7 Richard  J. Hoffman, Classics in the Courts of the United States 1790-1880,  American Journal of Legal 
History, Vol. 22. No1, page 69, does, however identify some exceptions, a notable one being ex parte 
Wrangham, 2 Ves. Jun. 609 (1795), a case involving Trinity Hall, Cambridge. In it Lord Loughborough used 
many classical allusions and quotes. However, Hoffman speculates, this may be that as Visitor for Trinity Hall 
he was keen to demonstrate that his classical training in Scotland was not inferior to that at Cambridge. 
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or in their decisions and when done so it was usually limited to appeals from Ecclesiastical 
Courts, where Canon Law and Roman Law stood side by side. 
 In seeking to explain the greater use of the classics by the courts in America, where in 
fact fewer judges were classically educated, than those in England, Hoffman drew attention to 
the general nature of polemical literature then in the country. In sermons, pamphlets, 
newspapers and various writings on national affairs classics played an important part. Because 
classics were present in the writings of Americans they could also be expected in judicial 
decisions, seen by Hoffman as a specialized form of polemicism. He gives greater weight, 
however, to two other factors. At the federal level judges had to work out the legal relationship 
between the states, and between a state and the federal government. In these respects, Britain, 
not organized as a federal state, could not provide an adequate legal model for the new country. 
Classics, particularly those referring to ancient constitutional arrangements, could and did play 
a role for judges and lawyers who attempted to deal with various problems that arose. 
Secondly, the question asked within states was to what extent ought English Law and practices 
be observed? Traditionalists thought they should be followed closely. Others, of whom 
Chancellor Wythe was a prominent example, believed that English precedents should not be 
slavishly followed and that Roman law should be the basis of a new system. In this cause they 
not only quoted widely in cases from Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis but also made as many 
classical allusions and references as possible; the intended effect of which being to heighten 





 Many lawyers had read Cicero's political works and criminal defences either in the 
original, those entering university would have to demonstrate competence in the classical 
tongues, or, more usually, in translation. A useful source was a popular translation, 
completed in 1740, of Cicero’s orations by William Guthie, a hack Tory writer from Grub 
Street in London. Surprisingly, Guthrie’s fondness for Cicero did not prevent him elsewhere 
lavishing praise on Julius Caesar as “perhaps the greatest man that was ever on earth” 8 . 
First published in 1744, Thomas Gordon, an English libertarian polemicist, appended 
Cicero’s four orations against Catiline, charged with plotting against the Roman republic, to 
his translation of Sallust, where further details of Cicero’s life might be obtained. Gordon 
prefaced his work with a lengthy discourse on what he saw as the true principles of 
government heavily drawing on those of republican Rome. This book, which soon travelled 
to the colonies, is said to have had a decisive influence on early American political culture 9. 
    
Caleb Bingham’s Columbian Orator, first published in 1797 was widely used in 
American schoolrooms in the first quarter of the 19 th Century to teach reading and speaking. 
In addition to pieces praising republican virtues this anthology, “  to improve youth and others 
in the ornamental and useful art of eloquence” , gave examples of the speeches of Cicero 
whose oratorical techniques were strongly praised and presented as a model for statesmen 
 
8 Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role Model for Early American Lawyers: A Case Study in Early Classical 
Influence, Classical Journal Vol. 73, page 315. 
9 Another much read book in late 18th Century America was  John Ward’s System of Oratory, first published in 1759, 




and lawyers to aspire 10. Over two hundred thousand copies of this influential book were 
published in twenty three editions over fifty years.   
 
 At university professors of law would combine teaching of English common law with 
Greek democratic principles and Roman republicanism in their lectures. This tradition began 
at the College of William and Mary with the appointment of George Wythe as the first 
professor of Law and Police 11.  
 
Employment in criminal trials. 
 Following Cicero's methods, many lawyers would inform jurors of their lack of 
experience and limited ability in criminal trials and of how little they were acquainted with 
the defendant, but despite this, a solemn sense of professional duty compelled them to 
represent him or her. After this self-justificatory preliminary, again in the manner of Cicero, 
attorneys would often try to blunt the prosecution evidence with dispassionate stylized 
arguments about human nature and behaviour which they submitted should govern the way 
jurors, assessed the facts. To reinforce what they said about universal human conduct 
lawyers frequently quoted from sentimental novels, at first imported from Britain but soon 
written in abundance at home. By the technique of concentrating on general norms of human 
behaviour, rather than upon the defendant’s discrete acts and intentions, lawyers sought to 
obscure the motives of their clients and encourage jurors to interpret the evidence with 
 
10  Especially in  “ Introduction, General Directions for Speaking”  and “ An oration on the powers of 
eloquence written for an exhibition at a school in Boston 1791” Columbian Orator, Caleb Bingham and Co, 
Boston, 1817, pp. 7-30 and pp. 282-287.  
11 On the place of classical rhetoric in American legal education, see Linda Levine and Kurt Saunders, 
Thinking like a Rhetor, Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 43 1993, pp. 108 – 122. 
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mercy. As well as throwing this oratorical cloak about their clients, lawyers would tel l jurors 
that by finding a defendant guilty they would have decided he or she had no sense of right 
and wrong and were like  amoral monsters found in gothic novels, which were popularly read 
at the time, and appeared  in theatrical melodrama 12 .  
In conducting defences, especially in capital trials, lawyers urged juries to insist on an 
almost absolute standard of proof before convicting their clients and to reject circumstantial 
evidence. Attorneys frequently underlined the gulf between jurors and defendants, who were 
often forlorn and on the margins of society, but, nonetheless, urged juries to accept that they 
had a special duty, stretching long back into history, to treat them, even if they were not 
objects of ready sympathy, with fairness, humanity and clemency. 
Contrasting strongly with the apologetic, dispassionate and formulaic type of criminal 
advocacy established throughout much of America, a small group of attorneys in New York, 
into whose hands much of the criminal work was concentrated during the first quarter of the 
19th century, developed an ardent form of oratory intended to show defendants as deserving 
of pity, and to inform jurors that displays of mercy would encourage obedience and instil l 
morality amongst rootless and impoverished people in trouble with the law 13 . Courts 
witnessed emotional language, flights of rhetoric, flashes of humour and even buffoonery. 
Reports of this distinctive advocacy were not always well received by attorneys in other parts 
of the country. To some extent, the "New York style" has been explained by the fact that the 
criminal bar in the city attracted to it a number of radicals from England and Ireland, where 
 
12 See, Michael Millender, The Transformation of the American Criminal Trial 1790 – 1875, Doctoral 
Dissertation, Department of History, Princeton University 1996, pp. 92 – 106. 
13 Michael Millender, ibid, pp. 108 – 122. 
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florid appeals to emotion and zealous advocacy, in the spirit of Thomas Erskine and Henry 
Brougham, were more ensconced. 
 
Major alterations in procedure, evidence and general oratory.  
   By the end of the second quarter of the 19th century profound procedural and evidential 
changes had swept across the United States. Appellate courts, convinced in their decis ions by 
trial judges and prosecutors, stressed the ability of defendants, as bearers of rights and aided 
by lawyers to enforce them, to look after their own interests during jury trials. They also 
rejected arguments that a guilty verdict could only be legitimate if based on direct proof; 
accepted circumstantial evidence14; and, very importantly, emphasized that jurors need only 
heed reasonable doubts, and not demand an almost absolute substantiation, when considering 
the prosecution’s case. Further, appeal court judges and writers of treatises on evidence 
maintained that jurors, through their everyday experiences of life, should be sufficiently 
confident to reach conclusions, even if not of complete certainty, about defendants' intentions 
and mental states from the evidence of their words and actions.  
   American oratory generally in the 19th Century was much influenced by two rhetorical 
texts, both written in the Eighteenth Century Scottish Enlightenment: The Philosophy of 
Rhetoric, by George Campbell and Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle Lettres by Hugh Blair. 
Stressing that human beings could discover truth through experience and only communicate 
it by recreating that experience in the minds of their listeners, the rhetorician was expected to 
 
14 On the acceptability of admitting circumstantial evidence into trials see, for example, the jurist James 
Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, Little Brown and Company, 1898, 




develop his own understanding by reflecting on experience and then to explain such 
comprehension to an audience by appealing to faculties of mind which included 
understanding and imagination. Following this approach, 19 th Century American orators 
often told stories of their experiences and or created “word pictures” to impart their ideas. 
The purposes of rhetoric was not merely to entertain, but to persuade listeners towards noble 
ends. 
   An essay entitled American Eloquence, from the United States Democratic Review 15 
written in 1854, described what it considered to be the chief characteristics of American 
oratory including their “Fervor”, strong “common sense”, “frank, open business-like air” 
and appeals to emotion. On the latter, it was said  
“Powerful and effective eloquence always has been and always must be addressed mainly 
to the passions or feelings in a man’s heart. What could all the metaphysical subtleties of 
Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus effect, in impelling men to action , or in accomplishing 
any great and grand end, when compared with that warm, gushing eloquence, coming from 
the heart and going to the heart? We care not how powerfully the intellect is addressed and 
stimulated, enlightened and convinced, by argument. But let us remember, the work is not 
effectually done, the grand end and aim of eloquence is not attained, till the consenting 
sympathies of the inner man of the heart are touched and roused and brought into action. 
True eloquence – effective , useful eloquence – must appeal to the heart, through the 
understanding and the conscience. It must open the floodgates of sensibility within us, and 
thus bring into exercise our active powers for the promoting of good or the preventing of 
 
15 Volume 34. Issue 1. pp.40-52. 
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evil, or else, its real power and utility will be of a very small amount. And such, we think, in 
a very grand degree, is the character of American Eloquence” 16. 
Attachment in public oratory to the classics waned generally, although some speakers held 
on to them tenaciously 17. 
 
A sea change in advocacy. 
  Changes in procedure, laws of evidence and the effect of the prevailing general style 
of oratory produced a sea-change in advocacy in court, at first in the big cities and then 
spreading beyond. Attorneys adopted the mix of flamboyance, appeal to emotion and 
aggression that has been their hallmark ever since 18. No longer able to argue that jurors were 
duty bound to acquit if there was any doubt in a case, they attempted to move jurors with the 
sincerity of their belief in the innocence of their client and, where possible, by closely 
examining evidence so as to point to different conclusions than those urged by the 
prosecution. Alternative versions, narratives, of what had happened were put forward. In 
doing so they jettisoned earlier objections to circumstantial evidence, the admissibility of 
 
16  Volume 34. Issue 1. page 45. 
17 One such was William Henry Harrison, elected as President of the United States in 1840, after a campaign in 
which his Democratic opponents had portrayed him as a simple frontier fighter, and a hard cider drinker living 
in a log cabin. In reality he was from the Virginia planter aristocracy and had studied classics and history. 
Once elected – and determined to slay this false image – he delivered a three hour inaugural address, on a cold 
March 1841 day in Washington, which employed many the rhetorical flourishes from his classical training and 
included  references to the ancient Athenian constitution. He caught a cold . Unfortunately, this later developed 
into pneumonia and he died soon after. 
18 J. A. Millender, The Transformation of the American Criminal Trial 1790-1875, Doctoral Dissertation, 
Department of history, Princeton University 1996, Chapter 7. Commercial necessity may well have contributed 
to the major changes in advocacy that occurred. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, Simon 
and Schuster, New York, 1973, pp. 270 – 275,” saw flamboyance, tricks and courtroom antics” adopted in the 
19th Century by lawyers, and not restricted to criminal cases, as influenced by business reasons. Lawyers 
constantly needed to advertise themselves to attract new clients. Although they could place notices in 
newspapers, word of mouth was the most effective way. Their style of advocacy was “more than a matter of 
personality; this behaviour created reputation; and a courtroom lawyer who did not impress the public and 
gain a reputation would be hard pressed to survive” ( Page 270). 
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which had been championed by the prosecution. Very unlike the earlier advocacy, which 
underlined differences between jurors and usually wretched defendants, lawyers started to 
stress the faculty of jurors to know the innermost thoughts and emotions of defendants, as 
well as their own, those of their spouse, or child, or neighbour. 
 Lawyers began to tenderly paint sympathetic pictures, often in the manner of sentimental 
novelists, of their clients to the jury. Addresses frequently became generously spiced with 
quotations from literature and poetry and the Bible. Because, as Tocqueville had observed, 
the great mass of people in nineteenth century America were largely indifferent to “what 
occurred in Rome and Athens” 19 , classical allusions to jurors became rare. This was not to 
everyone’s liking 20.  
 Sensationalism, as a tactic in criminal trails, appeared. Theatrical appeals to the emotions 
of jurors became more charged and were most probably taken to their extreme by William E 
 
19 Quoted by Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role Model for Early American Lawyers, Classical Journal. Vol.73, 
1978, page 318.  
20 In 1851, a contributor to the Democratic Review ( The American Bar in 1851, XXVIII, pp.195 – 209 ), 
presumably not merely  presenting  his own views but also those more widely held, wrote indignantly about a 
distinct decline in courtroom advocacy . In his opinion, the dearth of oratory was attributed, in part, to the 
number of inferior men who crowd themselves within the bar. ( Page 203. ) Following the election of President 
Andrew Jackson in 1828, and the introduction of Jacksonian democracy, aimed at giving citizens greater 
participation in the running of their country, admission to state bars became much less stringent. This coupled 
with growing legal business in an expanding economy led to more lawyers, many of whom had not undergone 
college education, where they would have been exposed to the classics. A further reason for what was seen as a 
fall in standards was said to be a lack of literary appreciation amongst the mass of the legal profession, college 
educated or not. According to the Democratic Review commentator, “They study law ……and they study 
nothing else …… They are content to know the verbiage of the law, and they bow reverently to the ipse dixit of 
ancient compilers of rules, and modern digesters of precedents. As to studying the classics, they were bored 
sufficiently with them at college. As to Burke and Milton, they throw no light upon the Rule of Shelley’s case , 
and a lawyer should not waste time upon them. Such members of the profession …. will never cultivate 
eloquence themselves, nor encourage its growth in others”.  The author of the article in the Democratic 
Review complained about “the disciples of the “black-letter school” who exerted “a pernicious influence”. 
They were also to be found elevated to the bench “where they are apt to discourage the display of those gifts in 
the advocate, of which they are destitute, either not appreciating their value, or ill-concealing their envy at the 
superior influence they exert upon jurors and auditors over their own bald exhibitions”. (pp. 203 -204. ). 
Further contributing to the neglect of eloquence in oratory, with some notable exceptions, principally works by 
Kent, Story, Hoffman and Greenleaf, were treatises and text books, written in a “disorderly, vague and jejune 




Howe21, a partner in the infamous New York firm of Howe and Hummel, who could, and did, 
cry "at will" to win the sympathy of the jury. Described as a sickening spectacle in A. H. 
Rovere's astonishing book, Howe and Hummel it often carried a jury to extraordinary 
decisions 22. Howe once, despite his considerable bulk, made an entire closing speech on his 
knees in front of the jury box. Another technique was to place the wife and children of the 
defendant in the front row “to gaze devotedly at the man on trial. If perchance a particular 
defendant did not have a pretty wife, fond children , or a snowy haired mother , he was not 
for that reason deprived of the sympathy they might create on his behalf. Howe would simply 
supply them from the firm’s large stable of professional spectators” 23. 
Theatricality also extended to clothing. At the beginning of a case, Howe would dress 
showily in a dove –grey suit and with much jewellry. As the days passed he shed his bright 
garments for darker suits and ties and stopped wearing watch chains, tiepins and rings. By 
the day the jury would be called on to decide the fate of his client his attire, matching his 
face, would be very sombre24.  
 Originally a Londoner, William Howe (1828-1902) professed on occasions to have been 
employed as a clerk at a barrister’s chambers in the early 1850s, frequently visiting courts in 
 
21 Over the course of his career William Howe represented over six hundred accused murderers – a greater 
number than the rest of the New York Bar combined. See Decadence of New York’s Criminal Bar, New York 
Times, 7th September 1902, page 34.  
22 Although Howe’s ability to cry was exceptional, others also used the technique. Indeed in 1897 the 
Tennesseee Supreme Court rejected a claim that public displays of emotion were wrong and held they migh t be 
positively good. “Tears have always been considered legitimate arguments before a jury. Indeed if counsel has 
them at his command, it may be seriously questioned whether it is not his professional duty to shed them 
whenever proper occasion arises”. Ferguson v. Moore, 39 S. w. 341, 343,Tenn. 1897. Quoted by Sadakat 
Kadri, The Trial A History from Socrates to O. J. Simpson. Harper, 2006, Page 299. 
23 R. H. Rovere, Howe and Hummel. New York, Farrar Straus, 1947. Powell and Paterson, Cicero the 
Advocate, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, page 33, compare this kind of appeal to sympathy with 
those made in ancient Rome, where a defendant would appear in mourning, unkempt and dirty in the company 
of  family and relatives in a similar way. Interestingly, a junior barrister interviewed considered most 
advocates  in modern England, whilst strongly discouraging displays of emotion from defendants, would 
encourage their relatives, respectably dressed, to be present before juries. 
24 Francis L. Wellman, Luck and Opportunity, MacMillan, New York, 1938, page 27. 
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the course of his work.25 It is at least possible to suggest that the histrionic advocacy 
observable in London at the time may have later influenced his style in New York26. 
 
Books began to be produced on forensic address, including an important series 
compiled by Judge J.W. Donovan. The first edition of Modern Jury Trials, published in 
1881, contained some forty condensed trials and ninety pages of descriptive matter, and 
formed a book of 700 pages. Despite being expensive, it sold many thousands of copies. 
Trial Practice and Trial Lawyers followed in 1883 and also met with success. It was 
confined mainly to descriptions of American advocates, preparing cases for trial and the 
conduct of court cases. Tact in Court was published in 1885. Deliberately moderately priced, 
and aimed at the great mass of young lawyers, it sold, in various editions, over thirty 
thousand copies in the following thirty years. The work contained a selection of short articles 
by eminent advocates. Amongst a great quantity of advice contained within the book were 
the necessities of thoroughly preparing cases and of formulating a credible intelligent theory 
why a party’s version of events should prevail, suitable confidence, no t over- confidence, 
attention to voice, gestures and appearance, avoiding the appearance of trickery (rather 
running against the approach taken by William Howe, although, perhaps, his success was in 
 
25 Howe claimed to had read law at Kings College, London and, after graduation, had entered the office of 
George Waugh ‘ a noted barrister’. There is evidence that he did work for  Waugh, who was a solicitor, not a 
barrister, for a number of years. In this capacity he attended court often. He also appeared in court as a witness 
in two murder cases and as a defendant in a criminal trial at the Old Bailey in 1854 concerning a perjured bail 
affidavit. Upon conviction, Howe received 18 months hard labour. See, James Morton, Uncovering the truth, 
Law Society Gazette, 18th October, 2007, 104/40, page 17. 
26  Perhaps it is not too unreasonable to speculate that the success of William Howe’s appeal to emotion and 
theatricality may, somewhat later, have influenced the histrionic styles of Earl Rogers (1869 -1922) in 
California and William Fallon (1886-27) in New York, the pre-eminent criminal attorneys of their respective 
bars. William Fallon, known as the Great Mouthpiece, became the inspiration for Billy Flynn, in the popular 
entertainment films Roxy Hart and Chicago. See Gene Fowler, The |Great Mouthpiece, A Life Story of William 
J.Fallon, Covici Friede, 1931. On Earl Rogers see Michael Trope, Once Upon a Time in Los Angeles: The 




being able to hide it), courtesy to the court and opposing counsel and careful selection of 
language before juries. On the latter A. B. Maynard, in an article entitled Tact in Trials 27, 
wrote: 
 
“I found farmers had one language, carpenters had another, country merchants had another 
and labourers another – these are the average jurymen. I adopted and used their catchwords 
and phrases, not as ‘clap-trap,’ or a ‘trick’, but to talk to them in their own language. I 
found it took better; they understood me and knew my meaning better. I never lost my suit by 
a jury’s ignorance of what I contended for”. 
 
Recognising the respect with which most jurors held judges, Maynard also strongly 
cautioned advocates from arguing with judges once they had ruled on a particular matter.  
 
In Winning cases, by “Different Counsel” the importance of stating facts simply 
before a jury was stressed along with illustrating points by comparisons with which jurors 
could easily identify 28. In this respect, the abilities of  Abraham Lincoln’s were much praised 
29.  This article also stressed usefulness of drawing on biblical stories 30. 
 In To cross- examine well, Judge Donovan urged a restrained form of cross-examination: 
 
27 Tact in Court, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1915, Edition,  pp.35-37. 
28 Tact in Court, ibid, pp. 49-54. 
29 It has been said that Abraham Lincoln well understood that a lawyer’s success depended more on his popular 
appeal than on his technical expertise. Charles M. Haar, The Golden Age of American Law, George Braziller, 
New York, 1965, page 4.  
 
30 By the time of Donovan’s Modern Jury Trials this had a long history, especially in some States,. In 
discussing 18th Century Connecticut, where until about 1750 it was common for church ministers to appear in 
court on behalf of neighbours, Sally Hadden, Professor of History and Law at Florida State University, said 






“Most young lawyers think they appear dull if they pass a witness without ‘tearing him to 
pieces’ under rigid questioning , and find that they have fed their enemy at every  question. 
Older advocates use this weapon with tact and caution. They have tried the sabre exercise 
too often, and remember the deep scars it produced on their clients”. 
 
 A little after he said: 
 
“The fine art of cross – examination is in making your case out of an opponent’s witness. 
This is almost always done by a gentle and delicate leading process coupled with concealed 
kindness that fascinates and encourages, whilst it creates the reasonable doubt or supplies 
the broken thread of a story that you are seeking to establish” . 
 
Donovan concludes: 
 “There are no better rules of cross- examination than five: (1) Know what you need, and 
stop when you get it. (2) Risk no case on the hazard of an answer that may destroy it (3) 
Hold your temper while you lead the witness, if convenient, to lose his. (4) Ask as if wanting 
one answer when you desire the opposite, if the witness is against you: and reverse the 
tactics if he is more tractable. (5) Treat a witness like a runaway colt; and see he does not 
get too much start on his master; and if he does , let go of the reins at the first safe turn in 




Lawyers who appeared before juries acquired knowledge, not found in books, about 
the way they often worked. In a satire, but which nonetheless reflected reality, written in 
1906, a commentator wrote of a system of “jury –made lawlessness, or juries imprudence , 
which recognizes rights that are forbidden by law and denies rights that are granted by law” 
. He then set out examples “of jurisprudence of lawlessness” including: “Any man who 
seduces an innocent girl may, without a hearing be shot , or stabbed to death by….any near 
relative and In prosecutions for stealing horses, cattle or hogs, the presumption of innocence 
is shifted in favor of the live stock , and the accused is presumed to be guilty” 31 . Attorneys 
who ignored these strong presumptions and other “unwritten laws” did so at their peril.  
 
Up until the beginning of the second half of the Nineteenth Century, courts in the 
United States generally conducted hearings in civil matters at a leisurely pace. Marathon 
speeches by counsel were allowed. The federal Supreme Court was described in 1824 as “Not 
only one of the most dignified and enlightened tribunals in the world, but one of the most 
patient,. Counsel are heard in silence for hours , without being stopped or interrupted” 32 . In 
the course of their speeches judges would sometimes deal with subjects remote to the matter 
in hand. The speed of court life hastened greatly as the growing economy brought with it 
burgeoning numbers of cases. To cope with them, courts did not have the time to listen to 
long speeches, even if judges wanted to. Attorneys had to adapt to this new reality in their 
advocacy.  
 
31 Thomas J. Kernan, The jurisprudence of lawlessness, Green Bag 18: 588 (1906). Cited by Lawrence M. 
Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 87-88. 
32 Quoted in Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Little, Brown and Co, 1922, 




Before lawyers were engaged in significant numbers in managing the legal and 
commercial affairs of the large corporations that emerged in the third quarter of the 19th 
Century, the business of lawyering was largely conceived as a courtroom activity, mainly 
carried out by attorneys in sole practice. Good ability in advocacy across a wide variety of 




Expression of belief in causes. 
       As in England and Wales, especially after Courvoisier’s case in 1840 and that of 
William Palmer in 1856 ( both  much reported  in America), there was discussion in the 
United States about whether advocates should be allowed to express belief in the causes of 
their clients. The first American code of ethics, that of the Alabama State Bar Association 
published in 1887, rejected any distinction between permissible and impermissible 
expressions of belief: All expressions of belief were disapproved: The Code stated: 
“The same reasons which make it improper in general for an attorney to testify for his client 
, apply with greater force to assertions , sometimes made by counsel in argument , of 
personal belief of the client’s innocence or the justice of his cause. If such assertions are 
habitually made they loose all force and subject the attorney to falsehoods; while failure to 
make them in particular cases will be esteemed a tacit admission of the client’s guilt, or the 
weakness of his cause” 33. 
 




       Similarly the American Bar Association, somewhat later in 1908, was unequivocal in its 
prohibition: 
 “It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client’s 
innocence or in the justice of his cause” 34. 
 
     While American judges repeatedly reaffirmed the no personal belief rule, there is 
evidence that some lawyers, in civil and criminal cases , disregarded it 35. Wide latitude was 
still permitted to lawyers expressing comments on the evidence. 
 
     During the second half of the 19th century, every state in the Union, save Georgia, 
granted accused persons the right to give evidence on oath at their trial 36. Like England and 
Wales, where the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 gave defendants similar rights, lawyers in 
the United States had to adapt their advocacy to take account of this shift in procedure which 
weakened their control over their client's defence. Also during this period, US advocates had 
to adjust to the growing use of expert evidence in court, as did their counterparts in England 
and Wales. Similar to there, it was for a time a habit to speak slightingly of the reliability of 
the testimony of expert witnesses. In one of the leading American law magazines a 
professional expert witness was defined as “a man who is paid a retainer to make a sworn 
statement” 37 . 
 
34 Canon 15.  
35 David Mellinkoff, Conscience of a Lawyer, St Paul, West Pub Co, 1973, Chapter 11. 
36 It was not until 1962 that defendants in Georgia were allowed to testify on oath. 
37 27 Am. Law Reg., iii., footnote., cited by Frederic Wrottesley, The Examination of Witnesses in Court, 





There is general agreement amongst legal historians that prior to 1800 the distinctively 
American feature of plea bargaining did not exist. Plea bargaining is a process by which a 
person agrees to plead guilty to a criminal charge in exchange for concessions by the 
prosecutor representing the state. The defendant waives the right to trial, loosing any chance 
of acquittal, but usually avoids conviction on a more serious charge. The state on the other 
hand, is not required to go through the expense of a trial. Matters negotiated in plea 
bargaining include reduction in the charges, a specific recommendation to the judge on 
sentence or an agreement not to oppose a request by the defence such as for probation. Plea 
bargaining began to appear in the early or mid-nineteenth century, apparently independently 
in a number of jurisdictions. It became a standard characteristic of American urban criminal 
courts in the last third of that century 38. Various explanations why it arose and grew have 
been put forward 39. They include heavy caseloads of judges, swelled by increasing numbers 
of  civil claims for remedies under newly invented torts, over crowded prisons and that plea 
bargaining conveniently , in a more bureaucratized criminal justice system, settled cases 
where guilt was obvious but problematic to prove, thereby lessening risk to both the 
defendant and prosecution. As most criminal trials were fast paced and frequently resulted in 
conviction, similar to England, plea bargains were an attractive alternative, especially for 
 
38 See Albert Alschuler, Plea bargaining and its history. Law and Society Review Vol 91 No2, 1979, pp. 211- 
246 ; Lawrence Friedman,  Plea bargaining in historic perspective pp. 247 - 260, same volume ; and John 
Langbein, Understanding the short history of plea bargaining, pp. 261-272, also in the same volume. 
39 See Mary Vogel, Coercion to compromise: plea bargaining, the courts, and the making of political 
authority. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 and George Fisher, Plea bargaining’s triumph : A history 
of plea bargaining in America, Stanford CA:Stanford University Press, 2003. 
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guilty defendants 40. By bargaining they had a hand in their own fate, rather than leaving it 
entirely to the not so tender mercies of the judge and jury 41. Attorneys in 19th Century 
America, both for the defence and prosecution, as an important aspect of their court work,  
had to develop the ability  to negotiate pleas. Competence by defence attorneys in composing 
and delivering pleas in mitigation following guilty pleas was essential.  
 
Bench Trials. 
In the 19th Century Maryland stood alone in allowing defendants to elect trial before a 
judge without a jury. These became known as bench trials. By the 1920’s, in that state, they 
far exceeded jury trials. Bench trials were particularly popular with those charged wi th 
sexual offences and black people, both at risk of prejudice from jurors. That judges could 
dispose of many more cases when sitting without a jury was noted as beneficial. Elsewhere 
there was some constitutional doubt whether a state could allow a defendant to waive the 
right to jury trial. This began to dissolve. In 1927 Michigan permitted the practice. Other 
states followed. The Supreme Court approved of bench trials in federal courts in 1930. 
Eventually almost states came to permit them. In some, Virginia and Mississippi are 
examples, they became very widespread for felony cases 42. Taking the jury out of the 
 
40 Lawrence Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century, Yale University Press, 2002, page 85, wrote: 
“Before plea bargaining became routine, these people went to trial- but the trials were quick, slapdash; they 
were typically lawyerless, and many of them started and finished within half an hour or even less” . 
41 Interestingly George Fisher, Plea bargaining’s triumph: A History of plea bargaining in America, Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, found, in his research in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, after 1866, 
when defendants were given the right to testify, that  the trial rate rapidly decreased and guilty pleas rose, 
presumably because of more bargains being struck. Although meant to safeguard defendants,  making them 
competent to give evidence paradoxically resulted in defendants having less advantage at trial. If they did not 
testify adverse inferences would often be drawn against them by jurors. Also if they testified there was then no 
prohibition on prosecutors commenting on their prior silence and questioning them about previous convictions. 
A reasonable interpretation of the increase in guilty pleas in Middlesex County is that defendants and lawyers 
were aware of these dangers. 
42 Lawrence Friedman American Law in the 20th Century, Yale University Press, 2002, page 87.  
23 
 
courthouse had a huge influence on advocacy, as it did in England. Unlike jurors, judges had 
no time for stirring speeches, sensationalism and histrionics. Strict attention to evidence and 
the law was required of attorneys, not appeals to passion, sympathy and prejudice 43.  
 
Conclusion. 
This article sought to examine key changes and influences on courtroom advocacy in the 
United States during the long Nineteenth Century referring to England and Wales for 









43 Lawrence Friedman, ibid page 88, mentioned the case of Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold in 1924 as a rare 
instance where a strong appeal to emotion was made to a judge sitting alone. Clarence Darrow, on behalf of the 
two young men, who had murdered a boy, apparently just for the thrill of doing so, made an impassioned 
speech in mitigation for their lives drawing on psychiatric reports.  They were spared death. The judge 
emphasised their youth. Friedman thinks it unclear whether Darrow’s eloquence, which was much reported,  
made any difference.   
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